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Abstract:  
We followed field workers administering a household survey over a 12-week period and 
examined how their reciprocal behavior towards the employer responded to a sequence 
of exogenous wage increases and wage cuts. To disentangle the effects of reciprocal 
behavior from other explicit incentives that occur naturally in long-term employment 
relationships, we devised a novel measure of effort that not only captures the notion of 
work morale but that field workers perceived as unmonitored. While wage increases had 
no significant effect, wage cuts led to a strong and significant decline in unmonitored 
effort. This finding provides clear evidence of a highly asymmetric reciprocity response 
to wage changes. Our estimates further imply that field workers quickly adapted to 
higher wages and revised their reference point accordingly when deciding on reciprocity. 
Finally, we consider a second measure of effort that was explicitly monitored and found 
no significant effect to any of the wage changes. This lack of impact illustrates that 
explicit incentives can easily outweigh the effects of reciprocity and highlights the 
importance of having a measure of effort that workers perceive as unmonitored when 
testing for reciprocity in long-term relationships. 
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1 Introduction
Reciprocity in labor relations implies that workers derive a psychological benet from return-
ing a generous treatment by their rm with better work morale. Accordingly, even in the
absence of explicit incentives, workers provide higher (lower) e¤ort if the rms wage o¤er
is higher (lower) than some reference wage perceived as fair. Introduced into modern eco-
nomics under the name of partial gift-exchangeand fair wage hypothesisby Solow (1979)
and Akerlof (1982), the theory provides an explanation for many labor market phenomena,
ranging from unemployment to wage rigidity (e.g. Akerlof and Yellen, 1990).
Numerous studies have found empirical support for reciprocity in labor relations.1 Yet,
the exact consequences of reciprocity for actual labor markets remain largely unresolved.
One of the main reasons is, perhaps, that the available evidence is predominantly based on
short-term experiments whereas in actual labor markets workers and rms typically engage
in long-term relationships. This raises a number of important questions. As workers get
used to a given wage increase, does their perception of what constitutes a fair wage change
and does this a¤ect their reciprocal behavior? Do workers care more about wage cuts than
they care about wage increases? Do explicit incentives that occur naturally in long-term
relationships whenever there is monitoring crowd out the propensity to reciprocate?
The ideal experiment to test for reciprocity in long-term relationships consists of measur-
ing the e¤ects of exogenous wage changes on a dimension of e¤ort that captures reciprocal
behavior but is truly unmonitored in the eyes of the worker. Otherwise, it is impossible
to disentangle the e¤ects of reciprocal behavior from other explicit incentives such as r-
ing threats or career motives. Empirically, observing an unmonitored dimension of e¤ort
is di¢ cult because the very act of measuring e¤ort (e.g. a piece rate) makes it likely that
the worker perceives it as being monitored. Furthermore, if a rm can monitor e¤ort, it is
typically interested in using it as an explicit incentive device.
In this paper, we solve these empirical problems by conducting a eld experiment in
which we consider the e¤ects of a sequence of exogenous wage changes on a measure of work
1See Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986); Blinder and Choi (1990); Agell and Lundborg (1995, 1999);
Campbell and Kamlani (1997); Bewley (1999) and the surveys by Bewley (2002) and Rotemberg (2006)
for interview evidence. Examples of laboratory experiments simulating worker-rm interactions are Fehr,
Kirchsteiger et Riedl (1993); Fehr and Falk (1999); Hannan, Kagel and Moser (2002); Charness, Frechette
and Kagel (2004) or Charness and Kuhn (2007). Fehr and Gaechter (2000a) provide an extensive survey
of some of this evidence. There is also a more recent but growing body of eld experiments testing for
reciprocal behavior in labor relations. Among them are Gneezy and List (2006); Bellemare and Shearer
(2009); Cohn, Fehr and Goette (2009); Kim and Slonin (2010); Kube, Marechal and Puppe (2010); and
Cohn, Fehr, Hermann and Schneider (2011). We discuss the relation of our paper to some of these studies
below.
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e¤ort that was computed only long after the employment relationship had ended. Since no
indication of this ex-post control was given during the experiment, workers perceived this
e¤ort measure as unmonitored.
The experiment took place in rural Kenya where, over a 12-week period, local eld workers
were employed to administer a household survey of more than 900 questions to approximately
3,000 community members. Answers to di¤erent questions of the survey could contradict
each other and eld workers were expected to spot and resolve these inconsistencies. However,
at no point during the employment relationship did the work supervisors attempt to check
or punish in any way for inconsistencies, nor did anyone know that we would compute such
a measure ex-post. In fact, the inconsistency statistics were computed via an algorithm only
more than a year later after the survey answers had been manually entered into an electronic
database. For all means and purposes of this experiment, inconsistencies therefore constitute
a (inverse) measure of e¤ort that eld workers perceived as unmonitored. In addition, to
assess the impact of explicit incentives, we consider a second measure of work e¤ort, blanks
and mistakes, on which eld workers were monitored daily, with the clear understanding
that insu¢ cient performance in this dimension would lead to dismissal.
Field workers were paid per survey and the experiment consisted of the following wage
changes. After six weeks of work at a constant wage that was several times higher than
the going market wage, the wage was increased by 45%. Three weeks later, the wage was
reduced back to the original level for one week. Finally, the wage was cut by 27% relative to
the original wage for the last two weeks. The eld workers did not know in advance about
any of the wage changes, nor did they know that they were taking part in an experiment.
Local discontinuity tests and panel estimates reveal that the 45% increase in the wage
did not have a signicant e¤ect on inconsistencies (our measure of unmonitored e¤ort). By
contrast, the decrease in the wage after the 3-week period of higher wages led to a large and
signicant increase in the rate of inconsistencies of about 35% relative to the rate before the
wage increase even though the wage after this decrease was again exactly the same as before
the wage increase. The wage cut of 27% below the initial wage rate during the last two
weeks resulted in an additional signicant increase in inconsistencies. Blanks and mistakes
(our measure of monitored e¤ort), on the other hand, did not respond signicantly to any
of the wage changes.
To interpret these results, we present an e¢ ciency wage model of worker e¤ort that
allows for both explicit incentives from monitoring as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and
reciprocity concerns as proposed by Rabin (1993). The model shows that if workers have no
reciprocity concerns, unmonitored e¤ort does not react to either positive or negative wage
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changes. The observed increase in inconsistencies (i.e. the drop in unmonitored e¤ort) in
response to the wage cuts therefore provides clear evidence of negative reciprocity. The
nding that inconsistencies increase even when the wage returns to its initial level implies
that workers use past wages as an important reference point in their assessment of what
constitutes a fair wage. Our experiment thus fully conrms Bewleys (2002) conclusion from
interviews with managers and labor leaders that "...employees usually have little notion of
a fair or market value for their services and quickly come to believe that they are entitled to
their existing wage, no matter how high it may be..." (page 7). Furthermore, the absence
of a signicant drop in inconsistencies after the wage increase is consistent with ndings in
laboratory experiments that the propensity to punish negative actions is stronger than the
propensity to reward positive actions (e.g. Charness and Rabin, 2002). In our model, this
asymmetry in reciprocal behavior obtains naturally either if workers have loss aversion or if
the marginal productivity of the rm with respect to e¤ort is decreasing.
The lack of any signicant reaction of blanks and mistakes (our measure of monitored
e¤ort) illustrates the importance of testing for reciprocal behavior in long-term experiments
with a dimension of e¤ort that workers perceive as truly unmonitored. According to our
model, this result obtains because the no-shirking constraint from monitoring binds across
all wage changes, thus outweighing the workersnegative reciprocity concerns. At the same
time, our nding of negative reciprocity for inconsistencies implies that the presence of
explicit incentives does not necessarily crowd out reciprocal behavior, as suggested by some
laboratory experiments (e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2000b). Otherwise, workers would have
provided minimal e¤ort on inconsistencies throughout the entire experiment.
A possible concern about our results is that inconsistencies increased because of some
idiosyncratic shocks that coincided with the exogenous wage cuts. The absence of a signi-
cant reaction of blanks and mistakes to any of the wage changes makes this a highly unlikely
possibility. Nevertheless, a seemingly superior approach would be to control for unobserved
shocks with a random control group of workers for which wages remain constant throughout
the experiment. The problem with such a randomization for our experiment is that, as in
most labor market situations, eld workers all knew each other, making it impossible to
prevent information spillovers. These spillovers could have led to potentially strong social
comparison e¤ects in the treatment group (e.g. Akerlof and Yellen, 1990), thus contaminat-
ing the estimated reciprocity e¤ect of wage changes. In addition, the control group might
have reacted to not receiving the treatment, with the sign of the resulting bias depending
on whether the control group wished to emulate or oppose the treatment group.2 Instead,
2Another way to prevent information spillover would be to set up an experimental environment in which
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our strategy consists of following eld workers through time and simulatenously subjecting
all of them to the exogenous wage changes. Hence, the control group for a given eld worker
is the same eld worker immediately before the wage changes (which were implemented
in the middle of the week on otherwise uneventful days). The advantage of this strategy,
which is close in spirit to the one adopted in another context by Bandiera et al. (2005), is
that the estimates do not su¤er from contamination biases and that we can control for all
time-invariant sources of heterogeneity with worker xed-e¤ects, thus increasing statistical
power. Moreover, to address the issue of potential time-varying unobservables, our panel
estimations allow for exible interactions with time e¤ects.
Our paper contributes to a growing body of eld experiments on reciprocity in labor
relations (see footnote 1 for references). Together with Kube, Maréchal and Puppe (2010)
and Cohn, Fehr, Hermann and Schneider (2011), we are the rst to examine the e¤ects of
wage cuts on reciprocal behavior in an actual labor market situation. In Kube, Maréchal
and Puppe (2010), workers performed a one-time task and received either a higher or lower
compensation than the advertised wage. Workers with higher than expected compensation
showed little evidence of increased productivity whereas workers with lower than expected
compensation showed a strong negative reaction. In Cohn, Fehr, Hermann and Schneider
(2011), workers were assigned to teams of two to perform an identical task at the same wage
during one weekend. The following weekend, the wage was randomly lowered for either one or
both workers of some teams. Wage cuts generally led to a signicant decline in productivity
but this decline was more than twice as large for workers whose team members wage was
not cut. By contrast, workers whose wages remained the same but witnessed their team
members wage being cut did not show a signicant reaction in productivity. These results
indicate that the workers reference of what constitutes a fair wage is inuenced importantly
by expectations and social comparisons, and that the e¤ect of deviations from this reference
is asymmetric.
The novelty of our paper relative to these two studies and, to our knowledge, all other
eld experiments on reciprocity in labor relations is that we devise a measure of e¤ort that
is unmonitored in the eyes of the workers. This allows us to test for reciprocal behavior and
in particular the presence of wage entitlement by following the same eld workers over an
extended period of time and estimating their e¤ort response to actual wage changes. If we
had instead adopted the usual approach in the literature and measured e¤ort with a directly
observable productivity variable, we would have had to limit our study to an experiment
the workplace of the treatment group is completely separated from the one of the control group. This is
unlikely to solve the identication issue, however, since the two groups would then be subject to di¤ering
workplace conditions.
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of very short duration so as to disentangle reciprocal behavior from explicit incentives that
occur naturally in repeated employment interactions.
We also believe that our inconsistency measure captures in many ways the notion of
work morale that the literature typically associates with reciprocal behavior; i.e. a coop-
erative attitude "...whereby gaps are lled, initiative is taken, and judgement is exercised "
(Williamson, 1985) and a willingness to make voluntary sacrices for the company (Bewley,
2002). Indeed, detecting and resolving inconsistencies implied that eld workers needed to
pay extra attention when administering the survey and ask the respondent to clarify his/her
answers when an inconsistency was spotted. This was an onerous and time-consuming
process, especially because respondents were often household heads who commanded sub-
stantial respect in their community. Since eld workers did not receive any direct or indirect
reward for this additional e¤ort, inconsistencies are likely to reect how much workers iden-
tied with the survey collection and how willing they were to go the extra mile for the
employer.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides context for our
experiment by developing an e¢ ciency wage model that combines explicit incentives from
monitoring with implicit incentives due to reciprocity concerns. Section 3 describes the
environment and the experimental design. Sections 4 and 5 present the di¤erent econometric
results as well as a variety of robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 A simple model of e¢ ciency wages
To provide context for our wage experiment, we build a simple model of e¢ ciency wages
that combines explicit incentives due to monitoring with implicit incentives due to reciprocity
concerns. The monitoring part is a discrete-time application of the shirking model of Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984). The fair wage part is close in spirit to Rabins (1993) two-player game
with reciprocity, as adapted to the labor market by Danthine and Kurmann (2008, 2010).
2.1 Model
There are T time periods during which a worker may be employed by the rm. If employed,
the rm o¤ers wage rate w per unit of work and the worker, after observing the wage o¤er,
decides to provide e¤ort level e per unit of work. If not employed, the worker is engaged in
an alternative activity that pays b < w.
Individuals do not discount time and have preferences over consumption, e¤ort and reci-
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procity. Per-period utility is
U = u(c)  v(e) + R(), (1)
where u(c) denotes the standard utility from consumption c with u0 > 0, u00 < 0; and v(e)
denotes the disutility from providing e¤ort e on the job, with v0 > 0 and v00 > 0 if e exceeds
some basic level of e¤ort for which the disutility of e¤ort is minimized and v0 < 0 and v00 > 0
otherwise. Without loss of generality, we restrict this basic level of e¤ort to e = 0 and thus
v0(0) = 0. The term R(), nally, denotes the psychological benet from reciprocity. If the
worker has no reciprocity concerns, then  = 0. Otherwise,  > 0.3
Following Rabin (1993), we dene R() as the product of the gift g(w; ) a rms wage w
represents to the worker and the gift r(e; ) the worker provides to the rm when reciprocating
with e¤ort e
R() = g(w; ) r(e; ). (2)
When workers perceive a wage o¤er as generous, i.e. g(w; ) > 0, their utility increases if
they reciprocate with higher e¤ort as long as re(e; ) > 0. Vice versa, if the gift of the rm is
perceived as negative, workers can make themselves better o¤ by reciprocating negatively.
To make (2) specic, we follow Rabin (1993) one more step and assume that g(w; ) and
r(e; ) are measured as the di¤erence in payo¤s implied by the other players action (i.e. the
wage paid by the rm, respectively, the e¤ort provided by the worker) and some reference
or norm level. For the rm, the payo¤ implied by workers e¤ort e is naturally given by
the prot function (e; ) = f(e; )   tc(), where f(e; ) denotes the rms production and
tc() denotes total cost. Both f(e; ) and tc() depend on potentially many arguments but
only production depends on the workers e¤ort. Given our assumptions about v() above,
the norm e¤ort level for the worker is naturally e = 0. The workers gift to the rm from
reciprocating with e¤ort level e therefore becomes
r(e; ) = f(e; )  f(0; ). (3)
Under the standard assumption that f(e; ) is strictly concave in a particular workers e¤ort
(or at least perceived as such by the worker), r(e; ) is strictly concave in e. For the worker,
the payo¤ function is naturally given by consumption utility u(c). Under the assumption of
no savings, u(w) is the workers payo¤ from an observed wage w and u(w) is the payo¤ from
3As opposed to our eld experiment where workers provide di¤erent kinds of e¤ort, the model considers
only one e¤ort dimension so as to keep the analysis more tractable. None of the implications is a¤ected if
the worker supplied e¤ort along di¤erent independent dimensions.
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reference wage level w that the worker considers as fair.4 Hence, the rms gift towards the
worker becomes
g(w; ) = u(w)  u(w). (4)
Given the strict concavity of u(), g(w; ) is strictly concave in w. Furthermore, g(w; ) is
decreasing in the fair wage reference w. This fair wage reference w depends potentially
on a number of di¤erent arguments, among them the workersoutside option (e.g. Akerlof,
1982); wages of peer workers (e.g. Akerlof and Yellen, 1990); the rms ability to pay (e.g.
Kahneman et al., 1986); and the workers own past wages (e.g. Bewley, 1999). Since the
focus of our wage experiment is on the e¤ect of past wages on w, we do not need to take a
stand on the relative importance of other arguments in w. At the same time, this discussion
makes clear that in order to study the e¤ects of past wages on reciprocity, it is crucial that
other arguments in w remain constant throughout the wage experiment.5
To introduce explicit incentives for the provision of e¤ort, we assume as in Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984) that rms stipulate some no-shirking level of e¤ort eNS > 0 and monitor
workers with constant probability d. If a monitored worker is found shirking (i.e. if e <
eNS), the worker is red in which case he obtains the outside option b < w for the time
periods thereafter (i.e. there is no rehiring). Otherwise, the worker gets to keep the job.
Any non-monitored worker gets to keep the job independently of the e¤ort level.6
Given these assumptions, consider a worker who is employed at the beginning of time
period t and receives wage o¤er wt. The value of employment is
V Et = max
et
(
1(et  eNS)[u(wt)  v(et) + R(et; wt) + V Et+1]
+1(et < e
NS)[u(wt)  v(et) + R(et; wt) + (1  d)V Et+1 + dV Ut+1]
)
(5)
4All results go through if we allow for savings as long as consumption is positively related to the wage.
5Several comments about our formulation of reciprocity relative to the literature are in order. First,
compared to Rabin (1993) who formulates reciprocity as part of a two-player simultaneous move game, our
environment has a clear sequential order where one player (i.e. the rm) is the rst mover and the other
player (i.e. the worker) is the follower. Furthermore, we only consider the problem of the follower. This
considerably simplies the analysis because the playerss beliefs of the other players actions and beliefs
collapse to the rst movers action as observed by the follower. Second, Rabins specication of r(e; )
and g(w; ) is somewhat more complicated because he species the gifts as the observed di¤erence in payo¤s
relative to some maximum possible di¤erence in payo¤s. This di¤erence is not important as long as concavity
of r(e; ) and g(w; ) is guaranteed. Third the literature emphasizes that a crucial determinant of reciprocal
behavior is the intention that a certain action conveys (e.g. Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). The maintained
assumption in our environment is that the rms wage o¤er appropriately conveys intentions.
6Alternatively, we can assume that there is no clearly stipulated no-shirking level of e¤ort eNS but that
the worker has beliefs about the probability d of getting red as a function of the provided e¤ort level; i.e.
d = d(e) with d0 < 0. It is possible to show that the results derived below are robust to such an extension
of the basic model.
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where
V Ut+1 =
TX
s=t+1
u(b) (6)
is the value of being detected shirking and getting red at the end of t; V Et+1 is the value
of continuing employment given some expected path of wages fwsgTs=t+1; while 1(et < eNS)
and 1(et  eNS) are indicator functions with value 1 if et < eNS and et  eNS, respectively.
To solve for optimal e¤ort, we focus rst on reciprocity concerns and temporarily abstain
from monitoring (i.e. we set d = 0). Under relatively weak additional conditions needed for
existence, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 There is a unique reciprocity e¤ort level eRt that solves v
0(eRt ) = re(e
R
t ; )g(wt; )
and is strictly concave in wt.
Proof: Appendix.
The optimality condition that denes eRt comes directly from maximizing utility with
respect to et and states that the marginal disutility from providing e¤ort equals the marginal
psychological benet from reciprocating wage o¤er wt.7 The strict concavity of eRt in wt is
a direct implication of strict convexity assumption of the disutility of e¤ort v() and the
strict concavity assumption of u() and f(e; ) (the strictness part of the assumption could
be relaxed for two of the three functions).
With eRt uniquely determined, we return to the optimal e¤ort problem in (5)-(6).
Proposition 2 Given wage o¤er wt and an expected path of wages fwsgTs=t+1, there is a
unique optimal level of e¤ort et dened as:
1. et = e
R
t if e
R
t < e
NS and

v(eNS)  v(eRt )
  R(eNS; wt) R(eRt ; wt) > d V Et+1   V Ut+1;
2. et = e
NS if eRt < e
NS and

v(eNS)  v(eRt )
  R(eNS; wt) R(eRt ; wt)  d V Et+1   V Ut+1;
3. et = e
R
t if e
R
t > e
NS.
Proof: Appendix.
The intuition behind the three cases is straightforward. Workers faces two di¤erent
constraints implied by a given wage o¤er: the implicit constraint from reciprocity; and
7Note that this optimal reciprocity condition assumes that ge(w; ) = 0; i.e. in the eyes of the worker, the
rms output is not a¤ected by a particular workers e¤ort. Hence, the rms ability to pay (which may be
an argument of the reference wage w and therefore inuence the rms gift) is considered exogenous.
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the explicit constraint from monitoring. The reciprocity constraint is described by the
condition v0(eRt ) = re(e
R
t ; )g(wt; ) in Proposition 1. The no-shirking constraint from
monitoring is described by the inequality constraint in Proposition 2. The left-hand side of
the constraint describes the utility loss of providing e¤ort eNS instead of eRt . This loss is
necessarily positive by the fact that, absent monitoring, eRt maximizes utility. The right-
hand side of the constraint is the expected loss in future utility from getting caught shirking
and being red. The two constraints are depicted in Figure 1 and together form what we
call the e¤ort function.
Depending on the level of the wage, either the reciprocity constraint or the no-shirking
constraint binds. In particular, if wt < wNS, where wNS is the wage for which the no-shirking
constraint holds with equality, the utility loss from providing eNS outweighs the expected
cost from getting caught shirking and the worker provides e¤ort eRt < e
NS according to
his reciprocity concerns (solution 1). Vice versa, if wt > wNS as drawn in the gure, the
no-shirking constraint outweighs the reciprocity constraint and the worker provides e¤ort
eNS > eRt (solution 2). Finally, for a su¢ ciently high wage, reciprocity concerns imply an
e¤ort level eRt > e
NS in which case the no-shirking constraint becomes moot since monitored
workers are never found shirking (solution 3).
Notice that depending on functional form assumptions, we may not observe all three of
the solutions. For example, if eRt exceeds e
NS at wNS, solution 2 never occurs. In turn, if
eRt < e
NS for any wage level, solution 3 never occurs. Also, a special but as it turns out
relevant shape of the reciprocity constraint obtains if workers perceive the rms payo¤f(e; )
as increasing in e¤ort up to some e¤ort level e = ~e and constant thereafter (i.e. f 0(e) = 0 for
e > ~e). For this particular functional form, there still exists a unique reciprocity constraint
that is increasing in the wage up to eRt = ~e and is at thereafter.
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2.2 Implications
The reciprocity constraint and the no-shirking constraint depend on the wage and the time
left in the employment relationship. We now consider the implications on e¤ort of varying
these two determinants, conditional on di¤erent assumptions about monitoring and reci-
procity.
8To see this, note that the assumption of f 0(e) = 0 for e > ~e introduces a non-di¤erentiability in
r(e; ) at e = ~e. Hence, lime!~e  re(e; )g(wt) > v0(e) and optimal e¤ort from reciprocity solves v0(eR) =
re(e
R; )g(w; ) for eRt < ~e and eRt = ~e thereafter. The resulting reciprocity constraint is close to the
reduced-form e¤ort function e = min(w=w; 1) postulated in Akerlof and Yellen (1990).
10
2.2.1 No monitoring
Consider rst a situation in which workers believe that e¤ort is not monitored (i.e. d = 0).
Under the standard assumption that workers do not have reciprocity concerns (i.e.  = 0),
we obtain the following unambiguous prediction.
Result 1 For d = 0 and  = 0, workers always supply e¤ort equal to the norm level e = 0,
independent of wage changes or the time left in the employment relationship.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. If workers do not have reciprocity, eRt = 0
by assumption that the disutility of e¤ort v(e) is at its minimum at e = 0. Since v() does
not depend on either the wage or the time left to T , et = 0 for all wt and t.
If we assume instead that workers have reciprocity concerns (i.e.  > 0), the predictions
of the model are radically di¤erent.
Result 2 For d = 0 and  > 0:
1. An increase (decrease) in wages leads to an increase (decrease) in e¤ort. In addition,
the increase in e¤ort in response to a given wage increase is strictly smaller (in absolute
terms) than the decrease of e¤ort in response to a wage decrease of the same magnitude.
2. E¤ort depends negatively on past wages as long as the reference wage level w is in-
creasing in past wages.
3. E¤ort does not change as t! T .
Result 2.1 follows directly from the concavity of the reciprocity constraint and the fact
that for d = 0, the no-shirking constraint never binds. The asymmetric response of e¤ort
to positive and negative wage changes has been discussed in several empirical studies (see
references in introduction) but, to our knowledge, as not been formally explored to date.
Also note that this asymmetry can be extreme for the special case discussed above where
the reciprocity constraint becomes at above a certain wage for which eRt = ~e. In this case,
an increase in the wage does not increase e¤ort whereas a decrease in the wage may lead to
lower e¤ort (provided that the wage cut is su¢ ciently large to imply eRt < ~e).
Results 2.2 and 2.3 are also direct implications of the optimal e¤ort condition in Propo-
sition 1. Together, the two results generate what Bewley (2002) calls wage entitlement; i.e.
that workers adapt over time to a given wage treatment, no matter how high it may be, and
come to use it to assess the fairness of the rm.9
9Without Result 2.3, we would not be able to disentangle the e¤ect of a reduction in time left in the
employment relationship from the e¤ect of changes in wages relative to past wages.
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2.2.2 Monitoring
Now consider a situation in which workers believe that e¤ort is monitored (i.e. d > 0).
Under the standard assumption that workers do not have reciprocity (i.e.  = 0), the model
predicts the following.
Result 3 For d > 0 and  = 0:
1. An increase in the path of wages fwsgTs=t leads to an increase in e¤ort from et = 0
to et = eNS if  v(0) + v(eNS) > d

V Et+1   V Ut+1

before the change and the resulting
increase in V Et+1   V Ut+1 is su¢ ciently large so as to revert the inequality. The exact
opposite inequality conditions have to be met for a decrease in the path of wages to lead
to a decline in e¤ort from et = eNS to et = 0.
2. As t ! T , e¤ort decreases from et = eNS to et = 0 for a given wage path if  v(0) +
v(eNS)  d V Et+1   V Ut+1 for some t < t0 < T and V Et+1 V Ut+1 becomes su¢ ciently small
for some t0 < t < T such that the inequality changes sign
Both of these results are a direct application of Proposition 2 for the special case where
the worker has no reciprocity concerns (in which case optimal e¤ort is 0 if the wage does not
satisfy the no-shirking constraint).
If workers also have reciprocity concerns ( > 0), the general solution from Proposition
2 obtains and the model makes the following predictions.
Result 4 For d > 0 and  > 0:
1. An increase in the path of wages fwsgTs=t leads to an increase in optimal e¤ort if the
reciprocity constraint is binding (i.e. solution 1 or solution 3 in Proposition 2); or if the
no-shirking constraint is binding (i.e. solution 2), the resulting increase in V Et+1  V Ut+1
is su¢ ciently large so as to make the reciprocity constraint binding. The exact opposite
conditions have to be met for a decrease in the path of wages to lead to a decrease in
optimal e¤ort.
2. As t ! T , e¤ort decreases from eNS to eRt < eNS for a given wage path if the no-
shirking constraint is binding for some t < t0 < T and V Et+1   V Ut+1 becomes su¢ ciently
small for some t0 < t < T such as to make the reciprocity constraint binding (i.e.
solution 1 of Proposition 2).
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While these two results seem may complicated, they are a simple extension of Results 3
and can be easily understood by reconsidering Figure 1 for di¤erent wage levels.
Three key lessons come out of this analysis. First, absent explicit incentives (either
through monitoring or other performance controls), e¤ort varies with wage changes only if
workers have reciprocity concerns. Second, wage entitlement in reciprocal behavior implies
that a temporary increase in the wage has a negative overall e¤ect on e¤ort. Third, the
presence of explicit incentives (e.g. through a monitoring-induced ring threat) may outweigh
reciprocity concerns, thus highlighting the importance of having a measure of e¤ort that
workers perceive as unmonitored when testing for reciprocity in long-term relationships.
3 Environment and experimental design
We rst provide an overview of the environment in which the eld experiment was conducted.
Then we discuss the details of the exogenous wage changes and the measures of monitored
and unmonitored e¤ort.
3.1 Environment
The experiment was conducted in the context of a household survey that took place in a rural
part of Kenya in 2007. The primary purpose of the survey was not the wage experiment,
but to collect socioeconomic information on participants in di¤erent community-based devel-
opment projects and consisted of an average of about 900 questions per survey (depending
on the size and activities of the household). The number of households to be surveyed was
initially targeted at 2500 and was later extended to more than 3000, as discussed below.
To administer the surveys, the principal investigators (PIs) hired 12 members of the local
community, which were selected based on a competitive interview process. The hired eld
workers were aged between 19 and 37, 7 women and 5 men, with a median age of 24. All
were economically average residents, all spoke English but none had university education,
and previous work experience was limited to occasional low paid employment and/or home
production (e.g. farming).
Prior to the start of the survey collection, the eld workers were invited to an extensive
4-day training camp that was organized by one of the PIs, assisted by a Kenyan student with
previous survey experience and a foreign student. The two students were responsible for the
supervision of the survey collection afterwards. The camp was held at a secluded lodge to
ensure full focus on the training and to foster a sense of team spirit. The workers also received
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a specially designed survey T-shirt and they were informed that upon successful completion
of the survey collection, they would be invited to a weekend retreat to another community
in Kenya. Furthermore, the PIs promised to organize a CV workshop and to provide a letter
of recommendation. All of these perks were o¤ered in an e¤ort to generate a friendly and
cooperative work environment that should dampen any reaction to wage changes.
After the 4-day training camp and a nal performance assessment, the eld workers
started administering the surveys. During the rst two weeks of work, one of the PIs was
present to help the two students in supervising and ne-tuning the survey collection. There-
after, regular work (i.e. without direct presence of the PIs) started. In the beginning, eld
workers typically administered between two and three surveys per day, six days a week.
Later on, as the survey collection became more e¢ ciently organized, eld workers increased
their workload to four surveys per day but were explicitly discouraged from doing more.10
3.2 Experimental design
Field workers were paid per survey. Under the initial compensation scheme, the rst three
surveys per day were paid 150 Ksh each and all subsequent surveys of the same day were
paid 100 Ksh each.11 Since eld workers administered on average between three and four
surveys per day, this implied a daily salary of about 500 Ksh three to four times more than
what a eld worker could hope to earn elsewhere.12
During the rst six weeks of regular employment, eld workers were paid the just de-
scribed compensation scheme, called the 150/100 treatmentfrom hereon. In the beginning
of work week 7, the wage rate was raised to 200 Ksh per survey (including for the fourth sur-
vey of the day and beyond). This new 200/200 treatmentrepresented an average increase
in daily compensation of about 45% and was communicated to the eld workers through a
video announcement by the PIs. The announcement came without specic information on
whether the raise was permanent or not. In return, the eld workers were asked to continue
administering the surveys with diligence and were reminded that they should not exceed
four surveys per day.13 The new 200/200 treatment continued for three weeks. In the
10For three weeks of the total employment period, eld workers administered surveys for only 5 days. Also,
some eld workers occasionnally exceeded and one eld worker consistently exceeded the limit of 4 surveys
per day. All of the results reported below are robust to whether we consider only the rst four surveys per
eld worker per day; and to whether we exclude the eld worker who consistently exceeded the limit of 4
surveys per day.
11Whenever possible, eld workers tried to administer four surveys per day, conrming that even 100 Ksh
per survey was well above their marginal outside option.
12At the time of the surveys, 500 Ksh were worth about US$7.4.
13The exact wording of all announcements is available in the appendix.
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beginning of week 10, the two student supervisors played a second video announcement to
the eld workers in which the PIs informed them that compensation reverted back to the
initial 150/100 treatment (i.e. 150 Ksh for each of the rst three daily surveys and 100 Ksh
for any additional survey). The justication given for this wage cut was budget limitations
that made the wage of 200 Ksh per survey unsustainable. A week later, in the beginning
of week 10, a third video was played to the eld workers in which they were informed that
employment would continue for an additional three weeks so as to expand the survey beyond
the initially planned 2500 households. For this extension of employment to be feasible, the
workers were explained that the wage would need to be cut to 100 Ksh for each survey per
day. This 100/100 Ksh treatmentrepresented an average wage cut of about 27% but it
also implied that employment continued for approximately three weeks longer than initially
anticipated.14 Finally, so as to avoid possible end-of-employment e¤ects, a nal video in
the beginning of week 13 (i.e one week before the planned end of employment) informed
the workers that since the target number of households had been reached, survey collection
would halt immediately.15
Figure 2 summarizes the di¤erent wage treatments over the 12 weeks of regular em-
ployment. Since work weeks started on Wednesdays, all video announcements about wage
changes were made on Wednesday mornings before work started and took e¤ect immediately.
Hence, the di¤erent work weeks in Figure 1 e¤ectively lasted from Wednesday to Tuesday.
None of the videos were preanounced and, to the best of our knowledge, did not coincide
with any other exceptional events. Also, at no point were the workers informed that they
were taking part in an experiment.
To measure work e¤ort, we consider two di¤erent types of errors for each survey. The
rst type of error we consider is inconsistenciesacross di¤erent answers of a survey. An
inconsistency occurred if, for example, a respondent answered in the occupation section of
the survey that he/she was not farming but indicated in the time-use section that he/she
spent time farming. In total, there were 93 possible inconsistencies per survey (see the ap-
pendix for the full list). Field workers were made aware of the possibility of inconsistencies
during training (without knowing about the 93 possibilities) and were instructed to pause
the interview if they spotted an inconsistency and probe the respondent in order to resolve
the problem. However, the supervisors never monitored or punished in any way for incon-
14The announcement also reassured the eld workers that the planned post-survey weekend retreat and CV
workshop was still on regardless of participation in the extra surveys. All eld workers continued employment
to the end even though they were free to quit at any time; and all of them joined the promised post-survey
retreat and participated in the CV workshop.
15Field workers continued to be paid 400 Ksh per day for the last week without work so as to honor the
promised employment contract.
15
sistencies, nor did anyone know that we would compute such a measure ex-post. In fact,
we drew up the list of 93 possible inconsistencies and computed the rate of inconsistencies
per survey via a computer algorithm only more than a year later after the di¤erent survey
answers had been manually entered into a database. For all means and purposes of this ex-
periment, inconsistencies therefore constitute a measure of e¤ort that eld workes perceived
as unmonitored.
The second type of errors we consider is blanks and mistakesand occurred if a survey
eld was either left blank (e.g. the eld worker forgot to ask/pencil in the question or
the respondent refused to answer) or the eld contained a clear mistake (e.g. reporting
zero households in the visited homestead). In contrast to inconsistencies, eld workers were
explicitly trained to avoid these blanks and mistakes, possibly insisting with the respondents
on an answer, and the two students supervisors checked incoming surveys randomly each day
for these errors (between 40% and 100% of the surveys were checked each day, depending
on the time available). We therefore label blanks and mistakes as monitored errors. If a
survey contained too many blanks and mistakes, the eld worker was given a warning and, in
case of repeated subpar performance, risked dismissal. This threat of dismissal was real. In
fact, during the rst two weeks of employment, one eld worker consistently made numerous
avoidable mistakes. Despite further extensive training, performance did not improve, and
the eld worker was subsequently laid o¤.
3.3 Discussion
As emphasized in the introduction and formalized by the model in the previous section, the
long-term nature of the wage experiment implies that eld workers had an explicit incentives
to perform well on monitored dimensions of e¤ort so as not to loose their job. The availability
of an e¤ort dimension that was truly unmonitored in the eyes of the worker is therefore
crucial to test for reciprocity. Our inconsistency measure ts this criteria. Hence, under the
standard assumption that workers do not have reciprocity concerns, inconsistencies should be
distributed randomly and unrelated to wage changes. If we nd instead that inconsistencies
change systematically with wage changes, then this represents prima facie evidence in favor
of reciprocal behavior.
4 Basic results
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for inconsistencies our (inverse) measure of unmon-
itored e¤ort and blanks and mistakes our (inverse) measure of monitored e¤ort. For
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the total of 2864 administered surveys during the 12 weeks of regular employment, there
was an average 4.65 percent of inconsistencies per survey (out of an average of 93.8 possible
inconsistencies per survey). This is considerably higher than the average rate of blanks and
mistakes of 1.31 percent per survey (out of an average of 911.6 possible blanks and mistakes
per survey).
As the standard deviations and extreme values in Table 1 indicate, there is considerable
variation in the two e¤ort measures. Closer inspection reveals that a substantial part of this
variation is idiosyncratic and not systematically associated with particular eld workers or
time in the employment relationship. To show the general evolution of inconsistencies and
blanks and mistakes, we therefore use local linear regressions to smoothen out this idiosyn-
cratic variation. In addition, to foreshadow our results below, we impose a discontinuity at
the days when the changes in wage treatment occurred (i.e. in the beginning of work weeks
7, 10 and 11).16 Figures 3 and 4 display the result. Three basic observations stand out:
1. There is a clear secular downward trend in the rate of inconsistencies. By contrast,
the rate of blanks and mistakes is trending upwards (abstracting from the rst two
weeks). This suggests that throughout the employment, eld workers accumulated
experience in detecting and resolving inconsistencies whereas for blanks and mistakes,
this learning-by-doing e¤ect was present only in the beginning or was outweighed later
on by other e¤ects, as discussed below.
2. Inconsistencies jump up substantially in the beginning of weeks 10 and 11 when the two
wage cuts took place. Interestingly, there is also a small positive jump in inconsistencies
at the beginning of week 7 when the wage increase was administered.
3. Blanks and mistakes also display jumps around the wage change days. But these jumps
are generally smaller and always negative.
While instructive, this visual inspection does not tell us whether any of the jumps are
signicant, nor does it indicate (by construction) whether there are important jumps for
weeks when no wage changes took place. To assess these issues formally, we proceed by
testing econometrically for jumps at the beginning of each workweek (i.e. each Wednesday).
16The discontinuities are imposed by estimating the local linear regressions separately on each side of the
days when a wage change occured. The idea to smoothen noisy data with local linear regressions around
discrete cut o¤s is taken from the literature on regression discontinuity designs (see Imbens and Lemieux,
2007 for a survey). The local linear regressions are computed in STATA using an Epanechnikov kernel.
Somewhat more variable plots but with exactly the same qualitative features would have obtained with
other kernels or if we had applied a simple moving average to the data.
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First, we reduce some of the idiosyncratic variation by purging the two e¤ort measures
of survey-specic e¤ects as described and estimated in the panel regressions of the next
section.17 Then we compute the di¤erence between the 3-day average of the resulting residual
e¤ort measures immediately preceding the beginning of the workweek and the corresponding
3-day average starting with the beginning of the workweek. Finally, to conduct inference,
we compute the bootstrapped 90% condence interval of the di¤erences.
Table 2 displays the results. As column (1) shows, the rate of inconsistencies increases
signicantly by 0.53 percentage points and 0.35 percentage points, respectively, in the be-
ginning of week 10 and week 11 when the wage cuts were administered. Relative to the
average rate of inconsistencies of 4.65 percent per survey, this represents an increase of 11.3
percent and 7.5 percent, respectively. By contrast, there is no signicant change for any of
the other weeks. In particular, in the beginning of week 7 when the wage was increased,
inconsistencies do not react signicantly. Column (2) shows the corresponding results for
the rate of blanks and mistakes. While there are several signicant changes during the rst
6 weeks, there are no signicant changes thereafter. Importantly, in the beginning of weeks
7, 10 and 11, the rate of blanks of mistakes essentially remains at.
Four key implications come out of these results. First, the signicant increase in the
rate of inconsistencies in the beginning of weeks 10 and 11 when wages are cut provides
clear evidence of negative reciprocity. As implied by Results 1 and 2 of our model, unmoni-
tored e¤ort reacts systematically to wage changes only if workers have reciprocity concerns.
Specically, a wage cut signals a smaller gift by the rm to which workers react with reduced
e¤ort. By contrast, there are no positive reciprocity e¤ects in response to the wage increase
in the beginning of week 7. As discussed towards the end of Section 2, such an extreme
asymmetry is consistent with the model if the reciprocity constraint becomes at above a
certain wage level. This can occur if the initial wage-e¤ort equilibrium is already so high
that, in the workersminds, additional e¤ort in response to an even higher wage does not
lead to a further increase in the psychological benets from reciprocating. Given that the
initial 150/100 treatment amounted to a daily compensation that was three to four times
higher than the going market compensation, this is a distinct possibility. By the same token,
the generous initial treatment makes the decrease of unmonitored e¤ort in response to the
wage cuts all the more striking especially since the PIs went to great lengths to foster a
cooperative work environment and the wage cuts were framed as necessary to respect budget
limitations.
17These survey-specic e¤ects are a eld worker xed e¤ects; a gender of the respondent control; a sublo-
cation control (where the survey took place); and a relationship control (i.e. relationship between the the
interview respondent and the household head).
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Second, the absence of a signicant drop in inconsistencies in the beginning of week 7
together with the presence of a signicant increase in inconsistencies in week 10 when the
wage was lowered back to the original 150/100 treatment suggests that workers adapted
quickly to the higher 200/200 treatment from week 7 to week 10 and came to believe that
this was the new reference against which a given wage o¤er should be judged. As implied
by Results 2.2 and 2.3 of our model, this wage entitlement e¤ect is a potentially important
source of asymmetric reciprocity behavior. At the same time, the local discontinuity tests
that we perform in Table 2 do not allow us to separate the e¤ects of wage entitlement from
secular time trends in inconsistencies as observed in Figure 3. The panel estimation that we
perform in the next section allows us disentangle these two temporal phenomena from each
other.
Third, the absence of any signicant response of blanks and mistakes to the di¤erent
wage changes in the beginning of week 7, 10 and 11 suggests that monitoring imposed an
important additional constraint that outweighed eld workersnegative reciprocity behavior.
Specically, recall from Result 4 of the model that a decrease in wages only leads to a
decrease in monitored e¤ort (i.e. an increase in blanks and mistakes) if either the no-shirking
constraint is not binding before the wage decrease or the wage decrease is su¢ ciently large
for the reciprocity constraint to replace the no-shirking constraint as the binding constraint.
The absence of a signicant reaction in blanks and mistakes to the two wage cuts therefore
implies that the no-shirking constraint was binding not only at the initial 150/100 treatment
but also at the lower 100/100 treatment, which seems plausible given the limited outside
options of the workers.
Fourth, the nding of negative reciprocity for inconsistencies implies that the presence
of explicit incentives does not necessarily crowd out reciprocal behavior, as suggested by
certain laboratory experiments (e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2000b).18 Otherwise, workers would
have provided minimal e¤ort on resolving inconsistencies throughout the entire experiment.
A possible concern about the results in Table 2 is that reciprocal behavior is irrelevant and
that inconsistencies increased instead because of some idiosyncratic shocks that coincided
with the wage cuts in the beginning of weeks 10 and 11. Several reasons speak against this
possibility. First and most importantly, if inconsistencies had increased because of some
large idiosyncratic shock (e.g. inclement weather, uncooperative survey respondents), one
would expect to see the same shock to also increase the rate of blanks and mistakes. This
is clearly not the case.19 Second, as described above, the estimates in Table 2 control for
18More specically, this crowding out argument means that reciprocity concerns simply disappear (i.e.
 = 0 in our model) if rms impose explicit incentives.
19As noted earlier, blanks and mistakes did change signcantly during the rst 6 weeks even though wages
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di¤erent survey-specic e¤ects. Third, the wage changes were implemented on Wednesdays,
in the middle of the regular week, on otherwise uneventful days. Closer inspection of the
data reveals, moreover, that the eld workersbehavior did not change noticeably in other
dimensions (e.g. the time used per survey or the average number of surveys administered per
day). Fourth, as Figure 3 shows, the signicant increases in inconsistencies in the beginning
of weeks 10 and 11 were not the result of a strong positive secular time trend due, for example,
to fatigue e¤ects. In fact, exactly the opposite is true: throughout the entire employment
relationship, the rate of inconsistencies exhibited a marked downward trend, interrupted only
by the jumps in response to the wage cuts. For all these reasons, it seems highly unlikely
that our results are driven by events other than the exogenous wage changes.
5 Panel estimates
To assess the e¤ect of wage changes further, we perform panel estimations on the full dataset.
The use of the entire dataset instead of just data around particular days increases power and
allows us to directly control for secular time trends.
5.1 Econometric specication
The panel regressions take the form
eijt = j + Dwage + Xijt + 1t+ 2t
2 + uijt, (7)
where i identies the survey; j the eld worker; and t the survey day. The dependent
variable eijt is alternatively the rate of inconsistencies or the rate of blanks and mistakes for
a given survey. The coe¢ cient j captures xed worker e¤ects; Dwage is a vector of dummy
variables for each of the wage regimes (described in detail below); and Xijt represents a set
of observable non-wage controls that may change systematically across surveys, eld workers
and time.20 The term 1t+2t
2 captures secular trends due for example to learning-by-doing
as observed for inconsistencies in Figure 3. We specify this trend in quadratic form so as to
provide the estimation with exibility to accommodate e¤ects that are either slowly dying
out over time or manifest themselves only over time. As shown below, the results are robust
to other forms of the time trend. Note also that this time trend is identied separately from
remained constant. By contrast, inconsistencies did not change signicantly during these rst six weeks.
This suggests that blanks and mistakes are more sensitive to idiosyncratic shocks than inconsistencies.
20Specically, Xijt includes indicators for the area in which the interview took place; the gender of the
interview respondent; and the relationship of the interview respondent to the household head.
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the wage dummies in Dwage because we make it a function of survey day t. Finally, uijt
denotes an uncorrelated error term.
The key coe¢ cients of interest are contained in the vector  and measure the e¤ect
that the di¤erent wage dummies in Dwage have on the error rate in question. In dening
these dummies, we face a choice of time interval per dummy. We choose to dene one
separate dummy per week. This is a natural benchmark because all wage changes occurred
on Wednesdays and because it provides a good trade-o¤ between sample size and su¢ ciently
small time intervals to capture the discontinuity around the wage changes.21 To identify the
e¤ect of each dummy on eijt, we dene week 6 as the reference, which is the last week of
the initial 150/100 treatment before the increase to the 200/200 treatment. Vector Dwage
therefore contains eleven dummies taking on the value of 1 for the respective week and 0
otherwise; and the di¤erent coe¢ cients in  = [1; :::5; 7; :::12] capture the impact of each
week relative to the omitted reference week 6. Remembering the timing of the wage changes
described in Figure 2, 7 captures the impact on eijt of the 200/200 treatment in week 7,
as opposed to the 150/100 treatment during reference week 6; 10 captures the impact of
returning to the 150/100 treatment in week 10 relative to the initial 150/100 treatment
during the reference period in week 6; and so forth.
5.2 Estimates
Column (1) of Table 3 displays the results for inconsistencies. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses below each estimate. There is no signicant di¤erence in inconsisten-
cies between the reference week and the rst ve weeks, where compensation is at the initial
150/100 treatment (for space reasons, we do not report these coe¢ cients). The rst three
coe¢ cients (7 to 9) capture the e¤ect on inconsistencies of the increase in compensation
to the 200/200 treatment in weeks 7 to 9. None of these e¤ects are signicant. By contrast,
the last three coe¢ cients (10 to 12) show that relative to the initial 150/100 treatment
during the reference period in week 6, the rate of inconsistencies jumps signicantly as the
wage rst returns to the original 150/100 treatment in week 10 and then jumps further as
compensation is lowered to the 100/100 treatment in weeks 11 and 12. In addition, as the
positive and signicant di¤erence in coe¢ cients 10 9 and 11 10 indicates, the increase
in inconsistencies is signicant not only with respect to the reference period in week 6 but
also with respect to the weeks directly preceding the wage cuts.
These estimates fully conrm the basic results of Table 2. Specically, the estimate for
21Results are robust to using smaller 3-day regimes and are available from the authors upon request.
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7 is insignicant whereas the di¤erences 10 9 and 11 10 are positive and signicant.
These two di¤erences are somewhat larger than the estimates for weeks 10 and 11 in Table
2, representing an increase of 18.5 percent and 13.1 percent in the rate of inconsistencies
relative to the average rate of 4.65 percent. The larger magnitude of these estimates is due
to the fact that the panel estimation considers weekly intervals rather than 3-day intervals
and includes a time trend. In line with the overall evolution of inconsistencies displayed in
Figure 2, this time trend is estimated to be negative except for the very beginning of the
employment relationship (i.e. the negative quadratic term quickly overpowers the positive
linear term), presumably capturing a learning-by-doing e¤ect.
The inclusion of a time trend allows us to separately identify the e¤ects of wage enti-
tlement and is captured by the large and signicant point estimate 10 of 1.573 percentage
points. Relative to the average rate of inconsistencies of 4.65 percent, this estimate repre-
sents a jump of 34 percent and measures the impact of returning to the 150/100 treatment
in week 10 relative to the same 150/100 treatment in reference week 6. Workers therefore
appear to have quickly adapted to the 200/200 treatment in weeks 7 to 9 and considered this
as the new norm even though the daily compensation implied by this treatment was several
times higher than any available outside options. This nding o¤ers direct support for Bew-
leys (2002) conclusion from interviews with managers and labor leaders that "...employees
usually have little notion of a fair or market value for their services and quickly come to
believe that they are entitled to their existing wage, no matter how high it may be..." (page
7).
Column (2) of Table 3 shows that none of the wage changes has a signicant e¤ect on
the rate of blanks and mistakes, conrming again the basic results of Table 2. Furthermore,
most of the signicant jumps in weeks 1-4 now disappear (not shown for space reasons). The
absence of signicant results for blanks and mistake in weeks 10 and 11 indicates one more
time that the large and signicant response of inconsistencies to wage cuts are not driven by
some random coincident events. Instead, the results in Column (2) suggest that the presence
of explicit incentives through monitoring outweighed the eld workersnegative reciprocity
behavior.
5.3 Robustness
To provide additional support for our results, we perform several robustness checks. Table 4
reports results from exploiting the particular wage structure during the 150/100 treatment
and the 100/100 treatment. The rst row tests whether, during weeks 1 to 6 when the initial
150/100 treatment was in place, there were possible e¤ects on monitored and unmonitored
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e¤ort of wage changes within each day. As the estimates show there is no signicant di¤erence
in either e¤ort measure between the third survey (paid 150 Ksh) and the fourth survey and
beyond (paid 100 Ksh). Hence, the negative reciprocity e¤ects found for wage changes across
time in Table 3 do not apply to wage changes within each day. This suggests that workers
reciprocity depends on changes in the wage contract as opposed to the details of a given
contract, lending further support to Bewleys (2002) conclusion that employees have little
notion of a fair or market value in absolute terms.
Rows 2 to 6 of Table 4 checks the robustness of our main results in Table 3 by using
only the rst three surveys for each day. All results are conrmed: (i) there is no signif-
icant reaction of inconsistencies in week 7 when the wage per survey is increased to the
200/200 treatment; (ii) inconsistencies increase signicantly as the wage returns to the base-
line 150/100 treatment in week 10; (iii) inconsistencies increase even further as the wage
drops to the 100/100 treatment in week 11; and (iv) there is no signicant reaction in blanks
and mistakes for any of the wage changes.
The last row of Table 4, nally, shows that there is also a strong and signicant increase
in inconsistencies for the rst three surveys per day in week 11, paid 100 Ksh each, relative to
the fourth survey per day in weeks 1 to 6 even though this fourth survey was paid the same
100 Ksh and was administered at the end of the day. This test provides further conrmation
of the wage entitlement e¤ect discussed above.
Table 5 goes through a battery of additional robustness checks for the panel regressions on
inconsistencies in Table 3. Column (1) repeats the baseline estimation of Column (1) in Table
3. Columns (2) and (3) show that none of the results change when (i) the reference week
is changed to week 5; and (ii) the two training weeks prior to the regular work relationship
are included (the weeks when one of the PIs was present). Columns (4) to (6) show that
the results are also robust to (i) omission of respondent controls; (ii) omission of sublocation
xed e¤ects; and (iii) replacement of the quadratic time trend with a linear time trend
(now estimated to be negative, consistent with Figure 2).22 Lastly, as discussed above, since
wage changes were enacted on a weekly basis, a week is the natural choice of time interval
per dummy. A more rened but less powerful analysis at a 3 day level, where Wednesday-
Thursday-Friday would form a rst block, and Saturday-Monday-Tuesday another (workers
took Sunday o¤), leads to essentially similar results.23
22Likewise, the results are robust to the inclusion of a cubic time trend.
23Results available upon request.
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6 Conclusion
This paper tests for reciprocity in labor relations using a eld experiment in an actual labor
market. The novelty of our paper relative to existing eld experiments in this literature
is that we devised a measure of e¤ort that workers perceived as truly unmonitored. This
allowed us to follow the same workers over an extended period of time and estimate how
their reciprocal behavior responded to a sequence of wage raises and wage cuts. The two
main results coming out of our experiment is that (i) workers exhibited negative reciprocity
with respect to wage cuts but no positive reciprocity with respect to wage raises; and that
(ii) workers quickly adapted to a new higher reference wage when deciding on the reci-
procity response to a given wage o¤er. Our analysis also reveals that explicit incentives on
monitored dimensions of e¤ort can easily outweigh the e¤ects of reciprocity; but that the
presence of explicit incentives in itself does not necessarily crowd out the workers propensity
to reciprocate.
These results may help understand a number of important labor market phenomena. In
particular, as Collard and De la Croix (2000) and Danthine and Kurmann (2004, 2010) show
in a dynamic general equilibrium context, the assumption of wage entitlement is crucial for
reciprocity-based e¢ ciency wage models to generate endogenous wage rigidity and for rela-
tively small shocks to imply large and persistent business cycle uctuations. Furthermore,
the asymmetric response of unmonitored e¤ort to wage cuts relative to wage increases pro-
vides an explanation for the lack of wage cuts (i.e. downward wage rigidity) observed in
many micro wage data sets of industrialized countries (e.g. Dickens et al., 2007). As Bew-
ley (1999) argues: "...resistance to pay reduction comes primarily from employers, not from
workers or their representatives, though it is anticipation of negative employee reactions that
makes employers oppose pay cutting. The claim that wage rigidity gives rise to unexploited
gains from trade is invalid, because a rm would lose more money from the adverse e¤ects
of cutting pay than it would gain from lower wages and salaries." (page 430-31). Viewed in
this way, this eld experiment represents a counterfactual of what a rm should not do, with
the negative reaction of workers to the wage cuts conrming Bewleys point.
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Figure 1: The e¤ort function
Figure 2: Timing of changes in wage treatments.
28
Figure 3: Average rate of inconsistencies (smoothed by local linear regression with Epanechnikov
kernel)
Figure 4: Average rate of blanks and mistakes (smoothed by local linear regression with
Epanechnikov kernel)
29
Table 1: descriptive statistics
(1) (2)
Inconsistencies Blanks and Mistakes
Average possible number per survey 93.8 911.6
Average rate across surveys 4.65% 1.31%
Standard deviation 2.50 2.03
Maximum rate 22.83% 33.56%
Minimum rate 0.00% 0.09%
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Table 2: Impact of wage changes on rate of errors
(Di¤erence in averages 3 days after, to 3 days before,
90% condence interval in brackets)
(2) (4)
Inconsistencies Blanks and Mistakes
Week 2 -0.06 -0.82
[-0.65,0.44] [-1.48,-0.21]**
Week 3 -0.03 -0.31
[-0.51,0.46] [-0.63,-0.05]*
Week 4 0.09 0.22
[-0.20,0.41] [-0.06,0.54]
Week 5 -0.0004 0.42
[-0.36,0.35] [0.14,0.73]**
Week 6 0.04 -0.37
[-0.38,0.44] [-0.62,-0.14]*
Week 7 (Wage=150-Wage=200) 0.16 -0.09
[-0.23,0.40] [-0.34,0.13]
Week 8 0.09 -0.11
[-0.14,0.38] [-0.27,0.20]
Week 9 0.06 -0.41
[-0.20,0.34] [-0.72,0.06]
Week 10 (Wage=200-Wage=150) 0.53 -0.14
[0.21,0.84]** [-0.40,0.14]
Week 11 (Wage=150-Wage=100) 0.35 -0.14
[0.003,0.72]* [-0.43,0.15]
Week 12 -0.39 0.1
[-0.79,0.01] [-0.21,0.44]
Di¤erence between the average of the dependent variable 3 days after the start of a
week, and 3 days before. The condence interval at 90% is obtained through bootstrap-
ping 400 times the sample with replacement. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%;
*** signicant at 1%. In column (1), the dependent variable is the residual from the
regression of the rate of inconsistencies on respondent controls, sublocation xed e¤ects,
eldworker xed e¤ects. Column (2) replicates the analysis with blanks and mistakes.
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Table 3: Impact of wages on rate of errors
(reference period: Week 6; 150/100 treatment)
(1) (2)
Inconsistencies Blanks and Mistakes
Fixed e¤ects for previous weeks Yes Yes
Week 7; 200/200 treatment (7) -0.016 -0.033
(0.277) (0.208)
Week 8; 200/200 treatment (8) 0.292 0.071
(0.368) (0.294)
Week 9; 200/200 treatment (9) 0.711 -0.057
(0.496) (0.396)
Week 10; 150/100 treatment (10) 1.573 -0.066
(0.678)** (0.541)
Week 11; 100/100 treatment (11) 2.185 -0.127
(0.884)** (0.706)
Week 12; 100/100 treatment (12) 2.691 -0.167
(1.146)** (0.930)
10   9 0.86 -0.01
(P-value) (0.003)*** (0.968)
11   10 0.61 -0.06
(P-value) (0.057)* (0.815)
Time trend 0.017 -0.002
(0.065) (0.051)
Time trend squared -0.001 0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0002)
Fieldworker xed e¤ects Yes Yes
Sublocation of interview xed e¤ects Yes Yes
Respondent controls Yes Yes
Observations 2864 2864
R-squared 0.19 0.08
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. The
dependent variable in column (1) is the rate of inconsistencies (number of inconsistencies in a survey divided by
the total number of potential inconsistencies, multiplied by 100). Fixed e¤ects for previous weeks are included.
The reference category is the 6th week where the wage was set at 150. Beta10-beta9 is simply the di¤erence
between the two coe¢ cients. The P-value associated is the P-value of the t-test comparing this di¤erence to zero.
A time trend, and a time trend squared, are always included to take into account learning e¤ects. Fieldworker
xed e¤ects are included. Respondentscontrols (sublocation xed e¤ects, gender, and relationship to household
head) are included. In column (2), the dependent variable is the rate of blanks per survey (number of blanks in
a survey divided by the number of cells to be lled in a survey, multiplied by 100), plus the rate of mistakes per
survey (number of mistakes divided by the total number of potential mistakes, multiplied by 100).
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d
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Appendix
A Proofs of Proposition 1 and 2
A.1 Proposition 1
In the absence of monitoring (i.e. d = 0), the workers problem reduces to
max
e
u(w)  v(e) + r(e; )g(w; ).
with
r(e; ) = f(e; )  f(0; ).
The rst-order condition is
v0(e) = fe(e; )g(w; )
Consider rst the case in which g(w; ) > 0. Then, the convexity of v (e) and the concavity of
f(e; ) imply that there exists a unique solution for e under the condition that lime!0 v0(e) <
lime!0 fe(e; )g(w; ). This last condition simply imposes that around e = 0, the marginal
psychological benet of reciprocating is higher than the marginal disutility of providing e¤ort.
Second, consider the case in which g(w; ) < 0. Then, there exists a unique solution for e
as long lime!0 v0(e) < lime!0 fe(e; )g(w; ); and v0(e) >  fe(e; ) for e below some e < 0.
The rst of the two condtions is as before. The second condition imposes that the marginal
harm that the worker can inict on the rm by exerting negative e¤ort (or more generally:
less than norm e¤ort) is at some point exceeded by the marginal disutility of doing so.
To prove concavity of optimal e¤ort in w, rewrite the rst-order condition as an implicit
function
 (e; w) =  v0(e) + fe(e; )g(w; ) = 0.
Applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain
de
dw
=  @ (e; w)=@w
@ (e; w)=@e
=
 fe(e; )gw(w; )
 v00(e) + fee(e; )g(w; ) > 0
by the concavity of f(e; ) and g(w; ) and the convexity of v(e). Applying a second derivative
with respect to w yields
d2e
dw2
=
 fe(e; )gww(w; )[ v00(e) + fee(e; )g(w; )]
[ v00(e) + fee(e; )g(w; )]2 +
fe(e; )gw(w; ) fee(e; )gw(w; )]
[ v00(e) + fee(e; )g(w; )]2 < 0,
again by the concavity of f(e; ) and g(w; ) and the convexity of v(e). This proves Proposition
1.
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A.2 Proposition 2
Consider the rst solution in which shirking is assumed to result in a higher value of em-
ployment than not shirking; i.e.
 v(eRt ) + R(eRt ; wt) + (1  d)V Et+1 + dV Ut+1 >  v(eNS) + R(eNS; wt) + V Et+1.
Rearranging this equation yields the condition in Solution 1 of Proposition 2
[v(eNS)  v(eRt )]  [R(eNS; wt) R(eRt ; wt)] > d[V Et+1   V Ut+1]
Since by denition, eRt maximizes the total utility from reciprocating, the left-hand side is
positive and represents the loss that would be incurred by not shirking. The right-hand side
represents the loss of being caught shirking. Since this right-hand side is assumed smaller
in this rst solution, it is optimal for the worker to supply e = eR < eNS. The other two
solutions follow naturally. This proves Proposition 2.
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B Announcements
The rst of the three announcements was read to the eld workers by one of the student
supervisors. The second and third announcement were made by video to the eld workers.
The PIs were not present for any the announcements. Hence, the scope for transmission of
additional information was very limited.
B.1 Wage change from 150/100 treatment to 200/200 treatment
I have to make an announcement on behalf of [the PIs]. It is unacceptable to do 5 surveys
per day. We only pay for 4 surveys per day. But we want you to do a really good job on
the four surveys. For that reason, we raise your salary to 200/survey for 4 surveys per day.
Please apply care and diligence when lling the surveys.24
B.2 Wage change from 200/200 treatment back to 150/100 treat-
ment
Hi guys,
I hope everything is going ne in Kenya. Because we cannot be here in Kenya, we asked
[the supervisor] to play this movie for you so that you get the news directly from us.
Were happy with your work up to now and we decided to do even more surveys. This is
very important for the research in order to have a better picture of the whole community.
Unfortunately, our budget is xed. For this reason, well have to return to the regular
salary: 150 per survey for the rst 3 surveys and 100 for the 4th one. As usual, you can
only do a max of 4 surveys per day.
Thanks again for all your work and I hope to see you soon.
B.3 Wage change from 150/100 treatment to 100/100 treatment
Hi guys,
I hope everything is going ne in Kenya since last week. As [the supervisor] probably told
you, we have some more information about the rest of the data collection.
As [one of the PIs] discussed with you during the training, we planned to interview about
2500 households. We now reached this goal, and so the original data collection o¢ cially
comes to an end: we want to thank you for the work that youve done on the project.
Now, it is important for us to obtain more data, so we decided to do three more weeks of
interviews. The last day of these three weeks is therefore Tuesday the 14th of August.
In order to reach our target of three more weeks of interviews, we have to o¤er a lower
pay of 100Ksh per survey for each of the rst three surveys instead of 150Ksh. This includes
lunch allowance.
24A possible concern about this announcement is that eld workers interpreted the emphasis on the
maximum number of 4 surveys per day as a reduction in the rms gift. This is unlikely for two reasons.
First, only one eld worker consistently exceeded 4 surveys per day and all results are robust to excluding
this eld worker from the estimation. Second, the supervisors never enforced the maximum number of 4
surveys per day and instead paid eld workers for all surveys they handed in per day.
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As before, you can do only 4 surveys max per day, with the 4th survey still being paid
100Ksh. So you can earn 400Ksh per day.
We realise that this is lower than before but with our budget, this is the only way for us
to do three more weeks.
Also we want you to know that the trip to Masailand is still on after these three weeks.
Thanks again for all your work and I hope to see you soon.
38
T
a
b
le
A
p
p
en
d
ix
1
:
in
co
n
si
st
en
ci
es
(N
B
:
in
so
m
e
ca
se
s,
th
er
e
m
ay
b
e
m
u
lt
ip
le
in
co
n
si
st
en
cy
p
os
si
b
il
it
ie
s
fo
r
a
gi
ve
n
re
as
on
(e
.g
.
if
ap
p
li
ed
to
m
u
lt
ip
le
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
m
em
b
er
s
or
m
u
lt
ip
le
fa
rm
p
lo
ts
))
In
co
n
si
st
en
ci
es
S
ec
ti
on
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
C
ov
er
S
u
rv
ey
en
d
ti
m
e
b
ef
or
e
su
rv
ey
st
ar
t
ti
m
e
S
u
rv
ey
n
u
m
b
er
b
la
n
k
b
u
t
n
ot
a
n
ei
gh
b
ou
r
(a
n
on
-n
ei
gh
b
ou
r
sh
ou
ld
h
av
e
a
su
rv
ey
n
u
m
b
er
)
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
on
fr
ie
n
d
,
b
u
t
th
e
re
sp
on
d
en
t
is
a
n
ei
gh
b
ou
r
(t
h
er
e
sh
ou
ld
b
e
n
o
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
on
fr
ie
n
d
if
th
e
re
p
so
n
d
en
t
is
a
n
ei
gh
b
ou
r)
T
h
e
re
sp
on
d
en
t
is
a
n
ei
gh
b
ou
r,
b
u
t
n
o
su
rv
ey
n
u
m
b
er
of
th
e
co
rr
es
p
on
d
in
g
N
G
O
m
em
b
er
H
ou
se
h
ol
d
N
o
ot
h
er
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
s
b
u
t
so
m
eb
o
d
y
in
th
e
h
om
es
te
ad
M
ar
ri
ed
an
d
li
v
in
g
w
it
h
sp
ou
se
b
u
t
n
o
sp
ou
se
N
ot
m
ar
ri
ed
,
m
ar
ri
ed
b
u
t
sp
ou
se
n
ot
in
h
om
es
te
ad
,
d
iv
or
ce
d
,
w
id
ow
ed
;
b
u
t
w
it
h
a
sp
ou
se
S
om
eo
n
e
is
p
ol
y
ga
m
ou
s
b
u
t
th
er
e
is
n
o
co
w
if
e
R
ep
or
ts
h
av
in
g
on
ly
1
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
in
th
e
h
om
es
te
ad
,
ye
t
re
p
or
ts
at
le
as
t
1
m
em
b
er
in
th
e
h
om
es
te
ad
ro
st
er
N
o
ot
h
er
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
s
in
h
om
es
te
ad
b
u
t
re
ce
iv
ed
a
gi
ft
s
fr
om
ot
h
er
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
in
h
om
es
te
ad
N
o
ot
h
er
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
s
in
h
om
es
te
ad
b
u
t
p
ro
v
id
ed
gi
ft
s
to
an
ot
h
er
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
in
h
om
es
te
ad
D
id
n
ot
re
n
t
ro
om
to
ot
h
er
s
b
u
t
re
ce
iv
ed
ro
om
re
n
ta
l
in
co
m
e
T
ot
al
h
om
ew
or
k
ti
m
e
in
fe
ri
or
to
su
m
of
h
om
ew
or
k
ti
m
e
at
so
m
e
m
om
en
ts
of
th
e
d
ay
P
eo
p
le
s
co
m
b
in
ed
ti
m
e
u
se
ye
st
er
d
ay
ac
ro
ss
ta
sk
s
is
gr
ea
te
r
th
an
24
h
ou
rs
N
o
tv
b
u
t
u
se
a
tv
N
o
tv
in
th
e
h
om
es
te
ad
b
u
t
n
o
tr
av
el
ti
m
e
to
u
se
it
T
h
er
e
is
a
tv
in
th
e
h
om
e
b
u
t
it
ta
ke
s
tr
av
el
ti
m
e
to
u
se
it
N
o
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
tv
b
u
t
u
se
a
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
tv
(I
N
T
IM
E
U
S
E
S
E
C
T
IO
N
)
N
o
h
om
es
te
ad
tv
b
u
t
u
se
a
h
om
es
te
ad
tv
(I
N
T
IM
E
U
S
E
S
E
C
T
IO
N
)
H
om
ew
or
k
-
so
m
eo
n
e
is
in
sc
h
o
ol
,
b
u
t
re
p
or
ts
h
av
in
g
sp
en
t
le
ss
h
om
ew
or
k
in
th
e
en
ti
re
d
ay
th
an
ju
st
af
te
r
su
n
se
t
N
u
m
b
er
s
of
ye
ar
s
of
sc
h
o
ol
in
g
is
at
le
as
t
3
ye
ar
s
gr
ea
te
r
th
an
ag
e-
7
R
ep
or
ts
b
ei
n
g
in
sc
h
o
ol
b
u
t
al
so
re
p
or
ts
re
as
on
s
fo
r
n
ot
b
ei
n
g
in
sc
h
o
ol
F
ar
m
in
g
D
id
n
ot
re
n
t
la
n
d
to
ot
h
er
s
b
u
t
re
ce
iv
ed
la
n
d
re
n
ta
l
in
co
m
e
H
ou
se
h
ol
d
cl
ai
m
s
n
ot
to
fa
rm
,
b
u
t
h
as
>
0
p
lo
ts
on
w
h
ic
h
it
fa
rm
s
H
ou
se
h
ol
d
m
em
b
er
w
or
ke
d
on
ow
n
fa
rm
ac
co
rd
in
g
to
ro
st
er
,
b
u
t
w
h
en
as
ke
d
w
h
et
h
er
m
em
b
er
s
of
th
is
h
h
fa
rm
,
th
e
an
sw
er
is
n
o
N
o
fa
rm
in
g,
b
u
t
ti
m
e
sp
en
t
fa
rm
in
g
on
p
lo
ts
(f
or
h
h
ea
d
an
d
sp
ou
se
)
G
ot
m
il
k
fr
om
m
il
k
in
g
b
u
t
h
as
n
o
ca
tt
le
S
ol
d
m
or
e
m
il
k
th
an
m
il
ke
d
fr
om
ca
tt
le
O
w
n
s
th
e
la
n
d
,
b
u
t
d
o
es
n
t
se
le
ct
th
is
op
ti
on
in
th
e
re
n
ta
l
ar
ra
n
ge
m
en
t
of
th
e
la
n
d
A
cr
es
cu
lt
iv
at
ed
m
or
e
th
an
to
ta
l
ac
re
of
th
e
sa
m
e
p
lo
t
A
cr
es
ir
ri
ga
te
d
m
or
e
th
an
to
ta
l
ac
re
A
cr
es
ir
ri
ga
te
d
m
or
e
th
an
cu
lt
iv
at
ed
N
o
ac
re
s
ir
ri
ga
te
d
b
u
t
m
et
h
o
d
of
ir
ri
ga
ti
on
B
u
si
n
es
s
N
o
H
ea
d
or
sp
ou
se
is
re
p
or
te
d
w
or
k
in
g
in
ow
n
b
u
si
n
es
s
(r
os
te
r)
ye
t
h
h
re
p
or
ts
h
av
in
g
a
b
u
si
n
es
s
ru
n
b
y
h
ea
d
or
sp
ou
se
(b
u
si
n
es
s
se
ct
io
n
)
R
ep
or
t
h
av
in
g
b
u
si
n
es
s
th
at
ru
n
s
on
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
an
d
is
lo
ca
te
d
in
si
d
e
h
om
es
te
ad
,
ye
t
h
om
es
te
ad
d
o
es
n
ot
h
av
e
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
C
re
d
it
A
m
ou
n
t
of
d
eb
t
re
p
ai
d
of
th
e
p
ri
n
ci
p
al
is
m
or
e
th
an
th
e
p
ri
n
ci
p
al
C
re
d
it
-
re
p
or
t
th
at
d
id
n
ot
tr
y
to
b
or
ro
w
,
ye
t
p
ro
v
id
ed
re
as
on
s
fo
r
b
ei
n
g
tu
rn
ed
d
ow
n
E
n
er
gy
U
se
d
el
ec
tr
ic
ap
p
li
ca
n
ce
b
u
t
d
id
n
ot
h
av
e
ac
ce
ss
to
an
y
so
u
rc
es
of
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
O
th
er
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
s
in
h
om
es
te
ad
u
se
d
el
ec
tr
ic
ap
p
li
ca
n
ce
u
se
d
b
u
t
d
id
n
ot
h
av
e
ac
ce
ss
to
an
y
so
u
rc
es
of
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
U
se
s
el
ec
tr
ic
sa
v
in
g
li
gh
ts
b
u
t
n
o
fo
rm
of
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
U
se
n
or
m
al
li
gh
ts
b
u
t
n
o
fo
rm
of
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
N
o
ac
ce
ss
to
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
ty
p
e
th
at
ca
n
p
ow
er
an
el
ec
tr
ic
st
ov
e,
ye
t
p
ow
er
s
an
el
ec
tr
ic
st
ov
e
N
o
ac
ce
ss
to
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
ty
p
e
th
at
ca
n
p
ow
er
an
el
ec
tr
ic
p
u
m
p
,
ye
t
p
ow
er
s
an
el
ec
tr
ic
p
u
m
p
N
o
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
w
h
at
so
ev
er
in
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
,
ye
t
u
se
a
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
tv
(I
N
T
IM
E
U
S
E
S
E
C
T
IO
N
)
N
o
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
w
h
at
so
ev
er
in
h
om
es
te
ad
,
ye
t
u
se
a
h
om
es
te
ad
tv
(I
N
T
IM
E
U
S
E
S
E
C
T
IO
N
)
R
ep
or
ts
n
o
ce
ll
p
h
on
e
b
u
t
u
se
s
it
s
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
to
ch
ar
ge
th
ei
r
ce
ll
p
h
on
e
S
o
ci
al
at
ti
tu
d
es
N
o
sp
ou
se
b
u
t
re
li
gi
on
fo
r
sp
ou
se
an
d
ac
ti
v
it
ie
s
S
p
ou
se
b
u
t
n
o
re
li
gi
on
fo
r
sp
ou
se
(o
r
p
u
t
as
n
ot
ap
p
li
ca
b
le
)
N
o
sp
ou
se
,
b
u
t
sp
ou
se
re
p
or
te
d
to
at
te
n
d
ch
u
rc
h
/m
os
q
u
e,
or
to
b
e
a
m
em
b
er
of
u
p
to
8
so
ci
al
gr
ou
p
s
S
p
ou
se
,
b
u
t
sp
ou
se
n
ot
re
p
or
te
d
to
at
te
n
d
ch
u
rc
h
/m
os
q
u
e,
or
to
b
e
a
m
em
b
er
of
u
p
to
8
so
ci
al
gr
ou
p
s
(o
r
p
u
t
as
n
ot
ap
p
li
ca
b
le
)
P
eo
p
le
w
at
ch
tv
fr
om
th
is
h
om
es
te
ad
,
b
u
t
n
o
ot
h
er
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
s
in
th
e
h
om
es
te
ad
:
D
o
n
ot
ow
n
a
tv
(i
n
h
h
or
h
om
es
te
ad
),
b
u
t
p
eo
p
le
co
m
e
to
w
at
ch
N
o
ra
d
io
li
st
en
in
g
b
u
t
ye
s
to
so
m
e
sp
ec
i
c
ra
d
io
sh
ow
s
N
o
tv
w
at
ch
in
g
b
u
t
ye
s
to
so
m
e
sp
ec
i
c
tv
sh
ow
s
W
e
n
ee
d
la
rg
er
in
co
m
e
d
if
er
en
ce
s
b
u
t
th
e
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
sh
ou
ld
ta
ke
m
on
ey
fr
om
th
e
w
ea
lt
h
y
an
d
gi
ve
to
p
o
or
:
W
e
n
ee
d
sm
al
le
r
in
co
m
e
d
if
er
en
ce
s
b
u
t
th
e
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
sh
ou
ld
n
ot
ta
ke
m
on
ey
fr
om
th
e
w
ea
lt
h
y
an
d
gi
ve
to
p
o
or
W
e
n
ee
d
la
rg
er
in
co
m
e
d
if
er
en
ce
s
b
u
t
in
co
m
es
sh
ou
ld
b
e
m
ad
e
m
or
e
eq
u
al
:
W
e
n
ee
d
sm
al
le
r
in
co
m
e
d
i¤
er
en
ce
s
b
u
t
in
co
m
es
sh
ou
ld
n
ot
b
e
m
ad
e
m
or
e
eq
u
al
W
ou
ld
b
e
w
il
li
n
g
to
ta
ke
ou
t
lo
an
fo
r
N
G
O
sh
ar
eh
ol
d
er
,
b
u
t
d
o
n
ot
tr
u
st
N
G
O
w
it
h
yo
u
r
m
on
ey
W
ou
ld
ve
ry
m
u
ch
li
ke
N
G
O
to
su
p
p
ly
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
to
ru
ra
l
ar
ea
b
u
t
d
o
n
ot
tr
u
st
at
al
l
to
m
an
ag
e
m
on
ey
to
b
u
il
d
m
or
e
p
ro
je
ct
s
(a
n
d
v
ic
e
ve
rs
a)
39
T
ab
le
A
p
p
en
d
ix
2:
b
la
n
k
s
an
d
m
is
ta
ke
s
Se
ct
io
n
N
am
e
of
va
ri
ab
le
bl
an
k
C
on
di
ti
on
to
b
e
no
t
bl
an
k
T
es
ts
A
ll
en
tr
yn
am
e
la
st
na
m
eh
ea
d
r
st
na
m
es
he
ad
lo
ng
o
la
to
re
sp
on
de
nt
r
st
na
m
e
re
sp
on
de
nt
re
la
ti
on
sh
ip
e
ld
w
or
ke
rn
am
e
N
on
e
33
6
da
te
o
nt
er
vi
ew
st
ar
tt
im
e
en
dt
im
e
ed
it
or
r
st
na
m
e
o¢
ce
ch
ec
kd
at
e
da
ta
en
tr
y
rs
tn
am
e
sa
09
01
sa
09
02
sa
09
03
sa
09
04
sa
09
05
en
04
1s
t1
a0
2
a0
5p
1
a0
6p
1
a0
6p
2
a0
7p
1
a0
7p
2
a0
8p
1
a0
8p
2
a0
9p
1
cs
01
09
lo
ca
ti
on
su
bl
oc
at
io
n
ne
ig
hb
ou
r
gr
ee
np
ow
er
m
em
b
er
lo
ng
it
ud
e
lo
ng
2
lo
ng
3
la
ti
tu
de
la
t2
la
t3
in
te
rv
ie
w
co
m
pl
et
e
re
ti
nt
er
vi
ew
co
m
pl
et
e
hc
01
hc
02
hc
03
hc
04
hc
05
1
hc
06
1
hc
07
hc
08
01
hc
08
02
hc
08
03
hc
08
04
hc
08
05
hc
09
02
hc
09
03
hc
09
04
hc
09
05
hc
09
06
hc
10
01
hc
10
02
hc
10
03
hc
10
04
hc
11
01
hc
11
02
hc
11
03
hc
11
04
hc
12
01
hc
12
01
oh
h
hc
12
02
hc
12
02
oh
h
hc
12
03
hc
12
03
oh
h
hc
12
04
oh
h
hc
12
05
hc
12
05
oh
h
hc
12
06
hc
12
06
oh
h
hc
12
07
hc
12
07
oh
h
hc
12
08
hc
12
08
oh
h
hc
13
hc
14
hc
15
hc
16
hc
17
01
hc
17
02
hc
18
hc
19
hc
20
hc
21
hc
22
hc
23
hc
24
hc
25
hc
26
hc
27
b
hc
27
c
hc
27
e
hc
27
f
hc
27
g
hc
27
h
hc
27
i
hc
28
2
hc
28
3
hc
29
en
01
01
en
01
01
oh
h
en
01
02
en
01
02
oh
h
en
01
03
en
01
03
oh
h
en
01
04
en
01
04
oh
h
en
01
05
en
01
05
oh
h
en
01
06
en
01
06
oh
h
en
02
a
en
02
ao
hh
en
02
b
en
02
b
oh
h
en
02
c
en
02
co
hh
en
02
d
en
02
do
hh
en
02
e
en
02
eo
hh
en
02
f
en
02
fo
hh
en
02
g
en
02
go
hh
en
02
h
en
02
ho
hh
en
02
i
en
02
io
hh
en
02
j
en
02
jo
hh
en
03
a
en
03
ao
hh
en
03
b
en
03
b
oh
h
en
03
c
en
03
co
hh
en
03
d
en
03
do
hh
en
04
1s
t2
en
05
01
en
05
02
en
06
01
en
06
02
en
06
03
en
06
04
en
06
05
en
06
06
en
06
07
en
06
08
en
06
09
a0
1
a0
3p
1
a0
3p
2
a0
4p
1
a1
1p
1
a1
1p
2
a1
20
1p
1
a1
20
1p
2
a1
20
2p
1
a1
20
2p
2
a1
20
3p
1
a1
20
3p
2
a1
20
4p
1
a1
20
4p
2
a1
20
5p
1
a1
20
5p
2
a1
20
6p
1
a1
20
6p
2
a1
20
7p
1
a1
20
7p
2
a1
30
1p
1
a1
30
1p
2
a1
30
2p
1
a1
30
2p
2
a1
30
3p
1
a1
30
3p
2
a1
30
4p
1
a1
30
4p
2
a1
30
5p
1
a1
30
5p
2
a1
30
6p
1
a1
30
6p
2
a1
30
7p
1
a1
30
7p
2
cs
01
01
cs
01
02
cs
01
03
cs
01
04
cs
01
05
cs
01
06
cs
01
07
cs
01
08
cs
01
10
cs
01
11
cs
01
12
cs
02
13
cs
02
14
cs
03
15
cs
03
16
cs
03
17
cs
03
18
cs
03
19
cs
03
20
s0
10
1
s0
20
1
s0
10
2
s0
20
2
s0
10
3
s0
20
3
s0
10
4
s0
20
4
s0
10
5
s0
20
5
s0
10
6
s0
20
6
s0
10
7
s0
20
7
s0
10
8
s0
20
8
s0
10
9
s0
20
9
s0
11
0
s0
21
0
sa
01
sa
02
sa
02
sp
sa
03
01
sa
03
01
sp
sa
03
02
sa
03
02
sp
sa
03
03
sa
03
03
sp
sa
03
04
sa
03
04
sp
sa
03
05
sa
03
05
sp
sa
03
06
sa
03
06
sp
sa
03
07
sa
03
07
sp
sa
03
08
sa
03
08
sp
s0
40
1
sa
04
01
sp
sa
04
02
sa
04
02
sp
sa
05
sa
05
sp
sa
07
01
sa
07
01
co
nf
sa
07
02
sa
07
02
co
nf
sa
07
03
sa
07
03
co
nf
sa
07
04
sa
07
04
co
nf
sa
09
01
m
em
b
er
sa
09
02
m
em
b
er
sa
09
03
m
em
b
er
sa
09
04
m
em
b
er
sa
09
05
m
em
b
er
sa
10
01
sa
10
02
sa
10
03
sa
11
01
sa
11
02
sa
11
03
sa
12
01
sa
12
02
sa
12
03
sa
13
gp
sa
13
no
ng
p
sa
13
ch
ild
sa
13
sp
at
01
at
02
at
03
at
04
at
05
at
06
at
07
at
08
at
09
01
at
09
02
at
09
03
at
09
04
at
09
05
at
09
06
at
10
01
at
10
02
at
10
03
at
10
04
at
10
05
at
10
06
at
10
07
at
10
08
at
10
09
at
10
10
at
10
11
at
10
12
at
11
01
at
11
02
at
11
03
at
11
04
at
11
05
at
11
06
at
11
07
at
11
08
at
11
09
at
11
10
at
11
11
at
11
12
at
11
13
at
11
14
at
11
15
at
11
16
at
11
17
at
11
18
gp
01
gp
02
gp
03
gp
04
gp
05
gp
06
gp
07
gp
08
gp
09
H
ou
se
ho
ld
hr
02
i
hr
03
i
hr
04
i
hr
05
i
hr
06
i
hr
07
i
hr
09
i
hr
10
i
hr
11
i
hr
12
i
hr
13
i
hr
14
i
hr
15
i
hr
16
i
hr
17
i
hr
18
i
hr
24
i
hr
25
i
if
na
m
e
pr
es
en
t
(h
r0
1
i
=
""
)
21
6
qu
es
ti
on
8
(s
m
ok
e)
>
=
12
ye
ar
s
12
qu
es
ti
on
s3
8-
58
>
=
5
ye
ar
s
25
2
qu
es
ti
on
s
19
-2
2
if
hr
18
i
=
1
48
qu
es
ti
on
s
28
,
33
>
=
12
ye
ar
s
24
qu
es
ti
on
s
30
,
31
,
32
>
=
12
ye
ar
s
an
d
hr
28
i
=
=
1
36
qu
es
ti
on
s
35
,
36
,
37
>
=
12
ye
ar
s
an
d
hr
33
i
=
=
1
36
H
om
es
te
ad
hm
02
i
hm
03
i
hm
04
i
hm
05
i
hm
06
i
hm
07
i
hm
08
i
hm
09
i
hm
10
i
hm
11
i
hm
12
i
if
na
m
e
pr
es
en
t
(h
m
01
i
=
""
)
13
2
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l
U
ni
t
pr
ic
e
of
a
pr
od
uc
t
bl
an
k
if
qu
an
ti
ty
so
ld
62
Q
ua
nt
it
y
so
ld
bl
an
k
if
un
it
pr
ic
e
no
nb
la
nk
62
B
us
in
es
s
R
ea
so
n
fo
r
no
t
do
in
g
bu
si
ne
ss
bl
an
k
N
o
bu
si
ne
ss
1
bu
03
i
bu
04
i
bu
05
i
bu
06
i
bu
07
i
bu
08
i
bu
09
m
i
bu
09
y
i
bu
10
i
bu
11
i
bu
12
i
bu
13
i
bu
14
i
bu
15
i
bu
16
i
bu
17
no
i
bu
17
ks
hs
i
bu
18
i
bu
19
no
i
bu
19
ks
hs
i
bu
20
no
i
bu
20
ks
hs
i
bu
21
i
B
us
in
es
s
23
C
re
di
t
cr
01
0
i
cr
02
0
i
cr
11
0
i
27
cr
03
0
i
if
cr
02
0
i=
=
2
9
cr
06
0
i
cr
07
0
i
cr
01
00
i
if
cr
02
0
i=
=
1
27
cr
08
a0
i
cr
08
b0
i
if
cr
02
0
i=
=
1
18
cr
12
0
i
cr
13
0
i
cr
14
0
i
if
cr
11
0
i=
=
1
27
T
ot
al
13
48
M
is
ta
ke
s
Se
ct
io
n
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
H
ou
se
ho
ld
Z
er
o
ho
us
eh
ol
d
in
th
e
ho
m
es
te
ad
1
Sm
ok
e
bu
t
le
ss
th
an
12
(q
ue
st
io
n
no
t
as
ke
d
to
un
de
r
12
):
12
N
ot
in
sc
ho
ol
,
bu
t
ho
m
ew
or
ks
.
12
T
ot
al
25
40
